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RECENT CASE
PRISONS-STATE MUST DEVISE SYSTEM ENSURING INDIGENT
PRISONER'S MEANINGFUL ACCESS TO THE COURTS
Plaintiffs, prisoners at various California facilities, chal-
lenged certain state-wide rules and regulations of the California
Department of Corrections governing inmate access to legal ma-
terials and to lay assistance in preparing writs and complaints.'
Also challenged were certain procedures of the California State
Law Library regarding circulation of legal materials to state pris-
oners.2 The prisoners grounded their challenges on two basic
rights: reasonable access to the courts and equal protection of the
laws. The rules and regulations, the prisoners charged, were arbi-
trary, unreasonable, and denied an indigent prisoner and his
"jailhouse lawyer" the legal resources necessary if access to the
courts was to be meaningful. The state answered these claims with
two alternative defenses: (1) access to legal materials is in the
nature of a privilege, not a right, and may be dispensed or refused
at the discretion of the government; (2) such rules and regula-
1. The regulation provides:
There shall be established in each institution a standard set of basic codes
and references which shall consist of and be limited to:
(1) The California Penal Code
(2) The California Welfare and Institutions Code
(3) The California Health and Safety Code
(4) The California Vehicle Code
(5) The United States and California Constitutions
(6) A recognized law dictionary (such as Black's)
(7) Witkin's California Criminal Procedures (Bender Moss Co.)
(8) Subscription to California Weekly Digest
(9) California Rules of Court
(10) Rules of United States Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit)
(11) Rules of United States Supreme Court.
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 107 n2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
In addition, Director's Transmittal Letter 26/66, to be read in conjunction with
this regulation, provides that "all existing law books and references in inmate law
libraries not consistent with this section are to be removed and destroyed." Id. at 107 n.2.
Director's Rule 2602, applicable to jailhouse lawyer activities, is also challenged, par-
ticularly one provision requiring that all legal papers remain in the possession of the
inmate to whom they pertain. Id. at 107.
2. The state library had set up a restricted list of law books which could be loaned
out to inmates. Only one copy of any particular set of books was available for inmate
use (there are over 30,000 California prisoners) and in many instances that one copy
was missing. Instant case at 107-08 n.4.
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tions are constitutional because they further legitimate state
interests: economy, standardization, prevention of jailhouse
lawyer/inmate friction regarding services rendered, and, in the
case of state library procedures, prevention of loss and mutilation
of legal materials by inmate borrowers. Held, the Department of
Corrections must devise a system which ensures that indigent
prisoners can obtain a full and fair hearing by the judiciary. It is
not necessary to declare the rule concerning possession of legal
papers unconstitutional, nor enjoin state library procedures. Gil-
more v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd sub nom.
Younger v. Gilmore, 92 S. Ct. 250 (1971).
The traditional reluctance of the judiciary to intervene in
prison affairs has been aptly termed the "hands-off doctrine." 3
The vitality which this doctrine once possessed is being constantly
diminished, particularly in the federal courts.4 The judiciary has
been least reluctant to intervene when the prisoner has been de-
nied access to the courts." The cornerstone for this right of access
was laid in 1941 by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Hull." The
Hull Court forbade prison officials to interfere with the habeas
corpus petition of any prisoner. Since this case was decided there
has been little doubt that a prisoner is entitled to relatively un-
inhibited access to the courts.
7
The right of access to the courts is rendered meaningless,
however, if a prisoner is incapable of making himself understood.
3. The term "hands-off doctrine" was apparently first used in FRITCH, CIVIL Riclirs
OF FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31 (1961) (document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons). See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to
Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). See also Hirschkop & Millemann,
The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969). According to Banning
v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954): "Courts are without
power to supervise . . . prison rules or regulations."
4. See generally J. CAMPBELL, J. SAHID, & D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED:
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT TO THE NATIONAL COMNMIS-
SION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIoLENCE 639 (1970).
5. Comment, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 985, 987 (1962).
6. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
7. See, e.g., Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969); Smartt v. Avery, 370
F.2d 788, 790 (6th Cir. 1967); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 137 n.1 (4th Cir. 1966);
McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964). This right of access, however, is
subject to innumerable restrictions. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971) (mail can be censored if prisoner has "abused" his right of access); Harell v. State,
17 Misc. 2d 950, 188 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (no right to litigate pre-conviction civil
matters).
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Since there is normally little or no legal assistance provided by
prison authorities, many inmates have been forced to seek aid
from other, more knowledgeable, prisoners-a practice formerly
forbidden by most prison authorities." In its most important pris-
oners' rights decision in nearly twenty years the United States
Supreme Court upheld this practice, provided the prison authori-
ties had not furnished the inmates with a "reasonable alterna-
tive." 9 Thus, access to the courts, in order to be meaningfully
exercised, has come to include the right to receive assistance from
other prisoners.
By far the most important issue here, however, is the extent to
which the indigent prisoner is entitled to access to legal materials.
Without such access neither he nor his jailhouse lawyer has much
chance of effectively utilizing the recognized right of access to the
courts.10 In the past, the judiciary has generally found that a pris-
oner has no right to engage in legal research; 11 if anything, access
to legal materials was deemed a privilege.12 Although the indi-
gent has received special attention from the judiciary in recent
years,13 his right of access to legal materials while in prison has
to this point been largely unrecognized. 4 While a few courts have
8. Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for Prisoners' Rights
Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473, 481 (1971).
9. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). What a "reasonable alternative" consists
of is open to conjecture. Ayers v. Ciccone, 303 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 431
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1970) indicates that Johnson's "reasonable alternative" must be an
attorney or at least someone with extensive legal expertise. An interesting suggestion has
been made by one writer that jailhouse lawyers be brought out into the open and given
the stamp of legitimacy, an enlightened method of prbviding a "reasonable alternative"
at a relatively low cost. See Wexler, The Jailhouse Lawyer as a Paraprofessional: Problems
and Prospects, 7 CRAiM. L. BULL. 139 (1971). Such a program is already in operation in
at least one institution. See Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No Assistance" Regulations
and the Jailhouse Lawyer, 1968 DuK, L.J. 343.
10. Vogelman, Prison Restrictions-Prisoner Rights, 59 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 386, 395
(1968); cf. Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 985, 992 (1962).
11. Cohen, Reading Law in Prison, 48 PRISON J. 21, 24 (1968); Krause, A Lawyer
Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. Riv. 371, 375 (1968). See, e.g., United States ex rel.
Henson v. Myers, 244 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Pa. 1965); People v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.
2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1955). An exception to the rule is In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470
P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970), which withheld judgment on this question pending
final disposition of the instant case.
12. Cf. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1439 (1968).
13. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (free counsel for indigent
defendants); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (state must provide adequate and effec-
tive appellate review for indigents).
14. Cohen, supra note 11, at 24. See also Comment, supra note 3, at 556.
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gone so far as to hold that they do not have jurisdiction over such
an issue,15 most courts have conceded jurisdiction and have been
willing to discuss the matter.
In Bailleaux v. Holmes,8 a group of prisoners challenged
several prison regulations which combined to severely limit their
access to legal materials. The lower court granted injunctive re-
lief, but the appellate court reversed the decision. In spite of its
reversal, the appellate court conceded the prisoners' right of ac-
cess to such materials.'7 It merely differed with the lower court as
to whether the restrictions upon that access were reasonable. How-
ever, the Bailleaux court foresaw possible abuse of this right if
prisoners were given unrestricted access.
State authorities have no obligation under the federal Constitution
to provide library facilities and an opportunity for their use to
enable an inmate to search for legal loopholes in the judgment
and sentence under which he is held, or to perform services which
only a lawyer is trained to perform.' 8
Although the Bailleaux court's choice of language may be unique,
other courts share its apprehension. Roberts v. Pepersack,0 for
instance, feared a similar abuse, although there it was labeled a
"fishing expedition." The Pepersack court summed up what ap-
pears to be the prevailing judicial attitude when it stated: "Prisons
are not intended, nor should they be permitted, to serve the pur-
pose of providing inmates with information about methods of
securing release therefrom." 20 This is not to say, however, that all
courts are so callous. In United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Prasse,2'
for example, plaintiff-prisoner argued he was in need of certain
court rules, books and legal opinions in order to properly prepare
his pending appeal. He contended that refusal to provide him with
15. Cohen, supra note 11, at 24. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240
F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957); Grove v. Smyth, 169 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958) (prison offi-
cials have exclusive jurisdiction; federal courts have no power whatsoever).
16. 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd sub nom. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961).
17. "[A]ccess to the courts means the opportunity to prepare . . . whatever plead-
ings or other documents are necessary or appropriate in order to commence or prosecute
court proceedings affecting one's personal liberty. ... 290 F.2d at 637 (emphasis
added).
18. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
19. 256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
20. Id. at 433.
21. 225 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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such materials denied him'his right of access to the courts. The
court agreed, although careful to limit its holding to the facts of
the-case.2 As evidenced by the Pepersack decision, however, such
judicial sympathy for the plight of the prisoner is rare. The deci-
sion in the instant case' represents a' bold reversal of this policy,
for the district court ignored the history of general judicial reluc-
tance to intervene and ultimately obtained approval of its actions
from the United States Supreme Court.
The court in the instant case abruptly dismissed the conten-
tion that access to legal materials is a privilege, not a right. The
very fact that the government put forth an alternative argument
implied that the government itself did not take the right-privilege
distinction. seriously. Nevertheless, the court was .careful to point
out that the state has the authority to restrict a prisoner's free
exercise of certain rights, but warned that such authority was sub-
ject to limitation:
[T]he basic test remains the same: the asserted interest of the
State in enforcing its rule is balanced against the claimed right of
the prisoner and the degree to which it has been infringed by the
challenged rule. Most prison regulations reflect the clear exigencies
of a penal situation and the courts are justifiably reluctant to ques-
tion their wisdom .... Other rules, though, touch upon inter-
ests of which the judiciary is more solicitous, and the burden of
justifying these regulations is especially heavy, comparable to the
'overwhelming state interest' required by Shapiro v. Thomp-
son .... 2
Thus, for the prisoners to prevail, it was necessary to estab-
lish that the challenged rules infringed upon their constitutional
rights to such a degree that the state's justifications were inade-
quate and unreasonable as a matter of law.24 The court then pro-
ceeded to take upon itself the task of measuring the effect of the
rules upon the prisoners, a burden it had previously placed upon
the prisoners. The court found that the approved legal sources
available to the prisoners "would offer meager fare to a criminal
lawyer,"'25 and rejected the government's argument that the in-
mate need only offer the facts of his case to state it adequately.
22. Id. at 754.
23. Instant case at 109. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), forbade the
classification of welfare applicants in the absence of a compelling governmental interest.
24. Instant case at 109.
25. Id. at 110.
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The court pointed out that while a prisoner was denied the means
by which he could competently state his points and authorities,
the state suffered no such handicap when replying to the pris-
oner's claim. 6 The court analogized the prisoners' plight here
with that in Johnson v. Avery, in which the United States Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized the relevance of legal exper-
tise, without which an indigent prisoner's valid claims may never
be heard 2
7
The attitude of the instant court, however, can be best sum-
marized by quoting the court itself:
Access to the courts ... is a larger concept than that put fonvard
by the State. It encompasses all the means a defendant or petitioner
might require to get a fair hearing from the judiciary ... .28
What these "means" consist of the court refrained from specify-
ing, although it was not hesitant in making suggestions .2  What-
ever "means" the state decided to provide its prisoners, however,
must first meet with judicial approval.
Finally, the court decided that it was not necessary to enjoin
the procedures employed by the state library. If the state provided
adequately for inmate legal needs, the activities of the state library
would become superfluous. Similarly, the court refused to declare
the rule regarding possession of legal papers unconstitutional.
The court strongly suggested that if the prison authorities inter-
preted this rule so as to allow a "jailhouse lawyer" to compose
such documents within his own cell, but not retain them when
completed, such court action would be unnecessary.
From the prisoners' point of view the Supreme Court's af-
26. Id.
27. "For all practical purposes, if illiterate and poorly educated prisoners cannot
have the assistance of a 'jailhouse lawyer,' their possibly valid constitutional claims will
never be heard in any court." Id., quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969).
It is interesting to note that another district court used Johnson v. Avery to justify hold-
ing that a state is not required to furnish a law library at its state hospital. Robinson
v. Birzgalis, 311 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1970).
28. Instant case at 110 (emphasis added).
29. At one point the court carefully detailed what the state had not provided in
its library (annotated codes, U.S. Reports, California Reports, U.S. Code, Rules of the
Federal District Courts, U.S. Law Week, etc.). Presumably, if the state provided an ade-
quate supply of these basic sources to its prison population, the court would be satisfied.
The court suggested other possibilities such as a public defender, or law student aid;
it made it clear, however, that the state was free to choose its own remedy, subject to
judicial approval. Id.
RECENT CASE
firmance30 without opinion of the lower *court's decision in the
instant case is a clear-cut victory. The prisoner has won the right
to be provided with the means by which he can, at least theoreti-
cally, communicate with the courts in an effective manner. The
benefit accrues not only to the prisoner, however. The court's
task will be simpler in the future because the prisoner will now
be able to speak the judge's "language," rather than the judge
having to decipher that of the prisonerf 1 Presumably, meritori-
ous claims, previously often unrecognized, will now receive the
attention they deserve. 2
Some stumbling blocks remain, of course. The major one, if
an expanded library rather than outside assistance is the state's
court-approved solution, will continue to be the prisoners' in-
adequate education and/or intelligence.3  For these prisoners,
the victory in the instant case is meaningless. No matter what
library facilities are made available, some prisoners will simply be
incapable of using them properly. The only way these inmates
can be assured of obtaining a complete and fair hearing by the
judiciary is to provide them with counsel.34 Even if the inmate is
not ignorant, a host of problems await him if he represents him-
self.35 All of these problems could be solved to a great extent if
30. 92 S. Ct. 250 (1971).
31. "Much of the judges' time is spent in trying to decipher and interpret the
chaotic papers that come to them from prison inmates." Report of the Committee on
Habeas Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 367, 384 (1963).
32. See Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in
the Crminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. Rlv. 493,509 (1970).
33. Cf. Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 343, 352 (1968):
"The uneducated writ-writer is not capable of intelligently analyzing the function of law
in our society or of interpreting the court decisions construing the law."
34. See Jacob & Sharma, supra note 32, at 509.
35. Since the inmate will often grasp at any authority agreeable to his claim and
correlatively reject anything contrary, the fruits of his research become distorted and
he has little sense of what the law actually is. Accordingly, when what the inmate con-
siders to be a strong and valid claim is ultimately rejected, he can not understand why
and becomes even further embittered.
If he should utilize the services of a jailhouse lawyer he runs the risk of being
deliberately mislead by an inmate whose sole purpose is to continue to receive payments
from him. Even if the jailhouse lawyer is sincere, his legal expertise can normally not
compare to that of a practicing attorney. Furthermore, any confidential information given
to a jailhouse lawyer by an inmate may later come back to haunt him in the form of
blackmail.
There are countless practical limitations simply because of his confinement which
contribute to hamper the prisoner or his jailhouse lawyer. He can not make investiga-
tions or seek out witnesses for questioning. The hours in which the library can be utilized
may be restricted. Important pages may have been removed from certain books by other
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the inmate were provided with competent counsel, namely a li-
;_nsed attorney. It is unfortunate that neither the district court
nor the United States Supreme Court, which merely approved the
lower court's decision, did not strongly suggest the providing of
such counsel.. Not-doing so in the instant case will almost certainly
result in another case coming before the Court involving that
specific issue.
Nevertheless, if the prison administrators will conscien-
tiously attempt to comply with the mandates of the Court's deci-
sion in the instant case the advantages will far outweigh the
drawbacks. Unfortunately, a belief that such an attempt will be
universally made is unrealistic at'best. Almost every right the
modern-day inmate enjoys has been achieved despite strong oppo-
sition by prison authorities. It is apparent that there still remain
some administrators who believe that a prisoner is a "slave of the
state." 36 Hopefully, these officials will realize that they have little
to lose by cooperating in such prison reform. Providing inmates
with the legal materials essential to prosecute their claims may
have a substantial impact upon low prisoner morale. Many in-
mates who are unsuccessful in their litigation are forever embit-
tered because they feel they were not given the opportunity to
learn the "tricks of litigation" which others, wealthier or better
educated than they, have used to win their freedom. 7 Possibly,
the knowledge that every legal "trick" was available to them
would ease the bitterness of defeat and make the prison authori-
ties' task of controlling the prisoners that much easier. Here
again, providing the inmates with competent counsel rather than
merely an expanded law library would constitute even stronger
inmates. In any case, the inmate is faced with constant frustrations in prosecuting his
own claim.
One further problem which may not be evident to the inmate at the time is caused
simply by the excessive amount of time which the inmate spends working on his case.
Whatever worthwhile rehabilitative programs are available for his use during his free
time may be totally neglected.
For a discussion of these and other problems, see Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Pris-
oners' Grievances, 39 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 173 (1970); Prison Writ-Writing: Three Essays,
56 CALIF. L. Rv. 342 (1968); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual
for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. Rav. 473 (1971); Note, Legal Services for
Prison Inmates, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 514,521.
36. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 796 (1871). See Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971). See +also Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970) for a judicial description of how callous prison authorities can be.
37. Cherry, A Look at Prisoner Self-Representation, 48 PRISON J. 28, 30 (1968).
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proof of fair and equal treatment, since the man who cannot
understand what is in a law library can take little comfort in
knowing it is available to him.
Possibly a more important aspect of this decision, however,
is that the prisoner now knows that the Burger Court is sympa-
thetic to his problems. If, as it appears, the "hands-off doctrine"
has been officially rejected in the area of access to legal materials,
future infringements upon other rights may receive commensu-
rate attention. A cautionary note should be added to this analysis,
however, because of the Court's cryptic per curiam opinion. Why
are there no dissenting or signed opinions? Why is there no dis-
cussion of the basic issues? Instead of spelling out exactly how it
feels, the Court simply affirms the judgment of the district court.
Surely, one of the Justices could have expanded upon the lower
court's opinion. Chief Justice Burger, for example, has been a
constant critic of the United States prison system; 38 yet, he did
not take advantage of the opportunity to express his own ideas on
the subject.
There are at least three possible explanations why the Court
did not delve into the matter more deeply. First, the "hands-off
doctrine" may not be as clearly rejected as the affirmance may
imply. The Court may have refrained from explicitly delineat-
ing its viewpoint at this point in time in order to allow the prison
authorities one more chance to correct their deficiencies. Perhaps
the Court felt that a simple affirmance was sufficient to prod these
authorities into affirmative action. The fact that the Supreme
Court felt strongly enough to affirm the lower court's decision
should indicate to prison officials that the Court is sympathetic to
the prisoners' pleas and any laxity on the authorities' part will
result in sterner action by the Court in the next prisoners' rights
case.
_Another possible explanation is that the Court simply does
not feel ready to expand upon the lower court's decision until a
"full" court is available to consider the issues. It should be noted
that at the time this case was being considered both Justice Black
and Justice Harlan had resigned from the Court and the vacancies
38. See, e.g., Burger, Paradoxes in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 58 J.
Cum. L.C. & P.S. 428 (1967); Burger Asks Prisons to Let Inmates 'Regulate Some Limited
Part of Lives,' N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1971, at 60, cols. 3-8; Burger Assails U.S. Penal System,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1970, at 16, cols. 1-3.
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created had not yet been filled. It is conceivable that the remain-
ing members'felt constrained to await a full complement of nine
members and the next prisoners' rights case before explicitly de-
lineating the 'Court's views. The current deluge of prisoners'
rights litigation would enable the Court to do so whenever it
chose.
Finally, perhaps the Attica tragedy cooled any ardor that the
Court may have had for leading the way in prison reform. 9 Pub-
lic attitudes toward prison reform were in turmoil during the
weeks immediately preceding the Court's opinion and perhaps
the Justices decided that they should take more time before ap-
pearing to undercut the authority of prison officials any more
than had been done already. If this hypothesis is true, the Court's
decision must be seen as a neutral, rather than an affirmative, act.
Under these circumstances, the instant case represents nothing
more than a holding action by the Court until the next such case
arises.
In any event, the United States Supreme Court did affirm the
lower court's opinion, although it left the strength of that affirm-
ance on questionable ground. Until the Court decides either to
overrule itself or to otherwise expand upon its views in other
prisoners' rights cases, all lower courts are bound to follow its
lead in compelling prison authorities to provide inmates with
adequate legal resources. Whether the courts will have to do so
depends upon the prison administrators themselves. If their ac-
tions are consistent with the principles espoused in the instant
case, such court action will not be necessary. As prisoners' rights
litigation has shown in the past, however, only after prisoners in
state after state bring actions to compel the providing of such
services, will the Court's apparent mandates become a reality.
ROBERT E. WHITE
39. The prisoner revolt at Attica took place September 9-13, 1971. The Supreme
Court handed down its decision in the instant case on November 8, 1971.
